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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Volume XVI.

MARCH, 1928

Number 3

INCIDENTS OF TESTAMENTARY EXECUTION.
Involved in the problem of the execution of wills are the
various questions: Vhat is sufficient publication of the will in
those jurisdictions which require it; what constitutes acknowledgment under a statute requiring that a will be signed or acknowledged. in the presence of witnesses; what is the significance of attestation by witnesses and what is the purpose of subscribing by them; what is the necessary order, if any, as to
signing by the testator and subscribing by the witnesses; may
the former signature of witnesses be adopted by them in a sub.sequent proceeding; may one witness validly subscribe the
name of another for that other at the latter's request; what is
the effect of the signature of the testator being covered up so
that the attesters cannot see it at the time of subscribing;
under what particular form of name, if any, must attesters
subscribe; what are the requirements as to physical place
on the instrument where testator and witnesses should sign;
and whit is the test of "presence" under the requirement that
a will must be subscribed in the presence of the testator? Each
of these questions is being continually litigated. Solutions of
some of these problems should have been clear long ago, but in
some of them the great variety of situations which the mind
can devise, or the exigencies of the moment create, require the
courts to attack such problems time and again.
The most important of these problems because. they have
in the past created the major difficulties, are probably (1) the
significance of "in his presence" (testator's) ; (2) the order of
proceedings, especially as to signing by testator and subscribing by the witnesses; (3) the place of signing particularly
under a statute which requires the signature to be placed "at
the end thereof"; (4) the character of the name subscribed by
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the attesters, and (5) the question of the adoption by attesters of
their former subscriptions.
1.

N THE PRESENCE Op THE TESTAToR.

Several considerations intrude in the determination of the
question, what does "in his presence" signify? The ability of
the testator to see the attesters while they subscribe is of
course important. Inclosure within the walls of the same room
has significance, if the room be not too large. Spacial contiguity alone is significant as well as the possibility of communication between the parties while the transaction is taking place.
It would seem apparent that if the attester is in the presence of the testator, the latter is also generally in the presence
of the former, though this converse proposition is usually not
considered. Any sight test alone which refuses to be concerned
with the other named considerations seems to be unsatisfactory.
The primary object of the statute is undoubtedly to prevent
fraud, and it should be interpreted.in the light of the purpose
of the legislature. But "when that is done no further requirments should be made by the courts.
The sight test is universally applied in England 1 and in
most of the American jurisdictions2 but is open to various objections. Ability to see the subscriber is not expressly required
'Davy v. Smith, 3 Salk. 395 (K. B. 1795). But if the parties be in
the same room it is not necessary for testator to see the act of subscribing, says the dictum; and the same dictum appears in Shires v. Glascock, 2 Salk. 688 (C. P. 1687); Hudson v. Parker, 1 Rob. Eec. 14 (1844)
(mental and not mere bodily presence required); Casson v. Dade, 1
Bro. C. C. 99 (1781); Doe v. Mainfold, 1 M. & S. 294 (K. B. 1813).
(Testator must be in a position to see without more movement than
inclining the head. Lord Ellenborough said, "If testator can see, he did
see, but I am afraid that if we went beyond the rule which requires
that the witnesses should actually be within the reach of the organs
of sight we shall be giving effect to an attestation out of the devisor's
presence").
2
Burney v. Allen, 125 N. C. 314; 34 S. E. 500 (1899) (testator must
be able to turn his head so as to see the act when parties are in same
room. Court goes further than the English requirements of Davy v.
Smith; Lamb v. Girtnian,33 Ga. 289 (1860); Drury v. Connell, 177 Ill.
43, 52 N. E. 368 (1898) (no mere contiguity is sufficient if testator
cannot see them subscribe); chofled v. Thomas, 236 Ill.
417; 86 N. E.
122 (1908); Calkins v. Calkins, 216 Ill. 458, 75 N. B. 182 (1905); Turner
v. Cook, 36 Ind. 129, 136 (1871) (it is not necessary that testator see
but that he be able to see the act if he so chooses); Healey v. Bartlett,
73 N. H. 110, 59 A. 617 (1904) (regards a man with infirmities so that
he cannot move as similar to a blind man); In re Biggan!'s Will, 68 N.
J.Eq. 572, 59 A. 874 (1905) (where attesters subscribe in another room
it is necessary for the proponent to prove that the testator placed himself in a position where he could see the act of subscribing); Mandevie
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by the statute. The possibility of seeing the hands of the attesters and the instrument at the time of the subscribing is quite
inadequate if the testator is unable to see the instrument continuously from the time it is handed to the attester until it is
subscribed and redelivered by him; yet the eases do not comment on this phase of the transaction; the attester may be
within the range of vision and still be so far away that ordinary
communication between the testator and. attester is impossible
and it is difficult in any rational way to say that the attester is
in the presence of the testator. In Bradford v. Vinton3 the
Michigan court, referring to the sight test, put the matter thus:
"If this is the correct criterion, then the rule instead of being uniform, Is subject to great fluctuations according to the degree of eyesight a person has. What would be in the presence of a far-sighted
person would be in the absence of a near-sighted one; and what would
be a valid execution of a will for one would be wholly worthless for
another with equal mental capacity; and a person wearing eye glasses
would have a larger presence than when he laid them aside. Under
such a rule the occulist would appear to be the most important witness
the testator must be in a position to behold the act unless he is blind.
Presence is not a technical or scientific word."

v. Parker, 31 N. J. E. 242 (1879); Jones v. Tuck, 3 Jones L. 207 (48 N.
C., 1855); Graham v. Graham, 32 N. C. 219 (10 Ired. L.) (1849) (testator could see their backs but not their hands); Hopkins v. Wheeler, 21
R. I. 33, 45 Atl. 551 (1900); Ray v. Hill, 3 Strobhart L. 297 (S. C.
1848); Nrock v. Nock, 10 Gratt. 106 (Va. 1853); Neil v. Neil, 1 Leight 6
(Va. 1829) (subscribing in the same room is prima facie in the presence
of the testator but subscribing in a different room is prima facie without his presence); Moore v. Moore, 8 Gratt. 307 (Va. 1851) (testator
might have seen the subscribing if he had gotten out of bed or had
changed his position and this he was physically able to do. The probate
decree upholding the will was sustained by an evenly divided court);
Sturdivant v. Birchett, 10 Gratt. 67 (Va. 1853) (will subscribed out
of testator's range of vision but it was brought back to him after one or
two minutes and one of the attesters said, "Here is your will which we
have witnessed," and showed him the subscriptions. It was held that
this demonstration and acknowledgment by the witnesses and the
adoption of their act by the testator cured the defect. But surely this
is erroneous. If it was not originally subscribed within the presence
of the testator the subsequent proceeding could not make the original
act comply with the statute). Of. contra In Re Downie's Will, 42 Wis.
66 (1877).
359 Mich 139, 148, 26 N. W. 401, 405 (1886). In Cook v. Winchester,
81 Mich. 581, 46 N. W. 106 (1890) also the attesters subscribed in another room and testatrix could not have seen the act without moving
and this she could not do, yet the act was held sufficient. The will was
brought back in and shown to her. While it is not thought that demonstration will cure the defect if the subscribing is done out of the presence of the testator, yet. this act is one of the circumstances to be regarded in determining what in this case constitutes the presence of the
testator. In an earlier case (Aiken v. Weckerly, 19 Mich. 482, (1870),
it was held that when -the subscribing is performed in another room,
the testator must be in a position to behold the act unless he is blind.
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Such a test causes the attestation and subscription of a
blind man's will to be a special case if the will is sustained, and
yet there is little difference spiritually between the presence of
a blind man and that of any other person 4 .
Massachusetts has held that the question of being able to
see the subscribing is not alone the sole test. The testator may
from physical infirmity not be able to turn so as to see the act
of subscribing and even though that act be performed in another
room, the transaction as a whole must be looked at. He must
be conscious of what is going on and understand what is being
said when he cannot see the attesters 5.
So in Cunningham v. CuninghmO the will was subscribed
in another room some ten feet away from the testator. He conversed with the attesters while they were subscribing and he
could have seen them by moving some two or three feet. They
were gone about two minutes and then returned and. showed
him their signatures. The will was valid.
If two blind men can be in the presence of each other, it
would seem to follow that two men with seeing eyes might be in
each other's presence in the dark. So it would follow that
though two men were not in the same room nor in sight of each
other they could still be in the presence of each other if they
were engaged in conversation with each other and conscious' of
the whereabouts and the general doings of each other. Under
such circumstances, if the attesters return and demonstrate
their signatures to the testator, this does not cure a previous
defect, but is an element affecting the question whether they
were continuously in the presence of each other.
There are of course, many cases where there can ne no
question but that the parties were not in the presence of each
'Goodfs of Piercy, 1 Rob. Ece. 278 (1845); State v. Martin, 2 La.
Ann. 667 (1847); Bynum v. Bynum, 33 N. C. 632 (1850); In re Allred's
Will, 170 N. C. 153, 86 S. E. 1047 (1915) ; Pickcett's Will, 49 Oreg. 127,
89 Pac. 377 (1907) ; Ray v. Hill, 3 Strobh. L. 297 (S. C. 1848) ; Reynolds
v. Reynolds, 1 Speers 253 (S. C. 1843).
'Raymond v. Wagner, 178 Mass. 315, 59 N. E. 811 (1901); RiggsV .
Riggs, 135 Mass. 238 (1883) (court says, however, "It is true as stated
in many cases, that witnesses are not in the presence of the testator
unless they are within his sight"); Cf. Mendell v. Dunbar, 169 Mass.

74; 47 N. E. 402 (1897).
080 Minn. 180, 83 N. W. 58 (1900); Cf. Neil v. Neil, 1 Leight 6 (Va.
1829) where testator's face was turned in opposite direction from attesters, though attestation was in same room and by testator's bedside,
the will failed.
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other, as when the testator falls asleep after he signs and before
the attesters have subscribed 7 or where the testator is in one
room in bed and an attester is in another room but the testator does not know where the latter is and is not in communica-

tion -with him8 ; or when the will is taken beyond the sight and
hearing of the testator although perhaps the subscribing is done
within the same building 9 ; or is taken to a remote place and

signed.
So again, when the testator is in a shop where the two attesters are, and procures one of them to subscribe at a time when
the other is engaged -with a customer who stands between the
testator and the second attester and the latter observed nothing
,of the transaction between the testator and the first attester,
the parties were not in the presence of each other 1".
2.

Tim PROPER ORDER oF EvENTs.

As to the order of signing by the testator and subscribing
by the attesters there are two distinct views. One is the English view that the testator must sign firsti. The other is sometimes called the American view that the order is immaterial and
the attesters may subscribe before the testator signs if the whole
matter"is a single transaction and the acts are substantially
synchronous. There is a pretty square split in the American
cases 1 2 . It is sometimes insisted that the English view is over
Orndorf v. Hummer, 12 B. Monroe 619 (Ky. 1851). It was held in
Blanchard v. Blanchard, 32 Vt. 62 (1879) that inattention on the part
of attester would not prevent attestation and subscription in his
presence.
'MpKee v. McKee, 155 Ky. 738 (1913).
Mendell v. Dunbar,supra n. 5.
1 Brown v. Bkirrow, 1902 P. D. 3.
u Goods of Olding, 2 Curt. 865 (Ecc. 1841). Goods of Byrd, ; Curt
Eccl. 117 (1842). Cooper v. Bockett, 3 Curt. Eccl. 648 (1843).
" Brooks v. Woodson, 87 Ga. 379, 13 S. E. 712 (1891) ; Horn's Estate
v. Bartow, 161 Mich. 20, 125 N. W. 696 (1910); Lane v. Lane, 125 Ga.
386 (1906) 54 S. E. 90; 114 A. S. R. 207 note; Duffit v. Corridon, 40 Ga.
122 (1869); Jackson v. Jackson, 39 N. Y. 153 (1868); Reed v. Watson,
27 Ind. 443 (1867); Chase v. Kittridge,11 Allen 49 Mass. (1865); In re
Karrer's Will, 63 Misc. R. 174 (118 N. Y. S. 427 (1909); Sisters of
Charity *. Kelly, 67 N. Y. 409 (1876); Miller v. Meeal, 35 Pa. St. 217
(1860); Fowler v. ftagner,55 Tex. 393 (1881); perhaps Allen v. Griffin,
69 Wis. 529, 35 N. W. 21 (1887) accord with the English view. O'Brien
v. Gallagher, 25 Conn. 228 (1856); Gibson v. Nelson, 181, Ill. 122, 54 N.
E. 901 (1899); Swift v. Wiley, 1 B. Monroe Ky. 114 (1840); Culter v.
Culter, 130 N. 0. 1, 40 S. E. 689 (1902); Cox's Will, 46 N. 0. (1 Jones
L.) 321 (1854); Kaufman v. Caughman, 49 S. C. 159, 27 S. E. 16 (1897)
contra.
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technical, or that the object of subscribing is to identify the instrument as the one whose execution was attested and the accomplishment of this object is not embarrassed by the following of
the reverse order of events 3 .
It is admitted however, by all, that the statutes both of
those states which follow in general the Statute of Frauds and
those which follow substantially the Wills Act, imply that the
testator should sign first. "Devises
.
.
shall . . . be
. . . signed
.
.
and shall be attested and subscribed,"
or "nd will shall be valid unless . . . it shall be signed
. . .and such witnesses shall attest and shall subscribe."
Again there is a distinct significance in this order. The
statutes provide that wills shall be attested. To attest means
to bear witness to some fact observed in some way. It is clear
that in general witnesses need not know the instrument attested
is a will, hence they do not attest this fact. The Wills Act requires the will to be signed by the testator or that he acknowledge his signature in the presence of attesters. They therefore
attest that they saw him sign or heard him acknowledge. The
two are precise alternatives. They could not attest that they
saw him sign if he signed later; hence it should follow that they
cannot attest his acknowledgment if he acknowledges later. But
why may they not attest the observance of an act which occurred after they have subscribed ? The answer is that subscription cuts off all further effective attestation. Subscription is
the last act. It not merely identifies the paper and the witnesses but it also shows that the transaction is concluded. If
they can attest an act occurring after the subscription it might
as well happen days after as minutes after. As to what they
attest after they subscribe they are not superior attesters to
those who may attest but never subscribe. Surely effective attestation ceases at the instant of subscribing. It would seem as
justifiable to sustain an insertion in the will made after the
signing and subscribing as to sustain a signing written after the
subscribing. The writer has observed no cases which sustain
the former view.
"Rood on Wills, 2nd Ed., 1926, §292.
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3. Tim PLACE oP THE SIGNATURE.
If the name of the testator appeared at the beginning of
the will or in the exordium' 14 it was regarded as a signature in
"Under this heading the following situations arise:(a)
The signature in the exordium. Lemayne v. Stanley, 3 Lev.
1 (C. P. 1681); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 29 Ala. 538 (1857); Miles'
Will, 34 Ky. 1 (1836); Meade v. Earle, 20M Mass. 553, 91 N. E. 916
(1910) ; Everhartv. Everhart,U. S. C. C., S. D. Miss., 34 Fed. 82 (1888) ;
Armstrong v. Walton, 105 Miss, 337, 62 So. 173 (1913); In re Phelan's
Estate, 82 N. J. Eq. 316, 647, 87 Atl. 625, 91 Atl. 1070 (1913); Plate's
Estate, 148 Pa. St. 55 (1892); Adams v. Field, 21 Vt. 256, (1849); Wailer
v. Waller, 1 Gratt. 454 (Va. 1845); Ramsey v. Ramsey's Exr., 13 Gratt.
*664 (Va. 1857); Roy v. Roy, 16 Gratt. 418 (Va. 1863); Savage v. Bowen,
103 Va 540, 49 S. E. 668, (1905).
(b) The signature may occur prior spatially to the last part of
the will though written later in time. (Some English cases are cited,
though they do not afford great assistance, having in most cases been
decided either before the Statute of Wills or after the Lord St. Leonard's Act); Roberts v. Phtllips, 4 El. & Bl. 450 (K. B. 1855); Goods of
W~odley, 3 Sw. & Tr. 429 (1864); Margary v. Robinson, L. R. 12 P. D.
8 (1887); Sweetland v. Sweetland, 4 Sw. & Tr. 6 (Ece. 1865); Dallow's
Case, L. R. 1 P. & D. 189 (1866); Goods of Milward, 1 Curt. 913 (Ecc.
1838); Goods of Ainsworth, L. R. 2 P. & D. 151 (1870); Goods of
Madden, (1905) 2 Ir. K. B. 612; Reed v. Watson, supra n. 12; Ward v.
Putnam, 119 Ky. 889 (1905); Brady v. McCrosson, 5 Redf. Sur. 431 (N.
Y.); Sisters of Charity v. Kelly, supra note 12; In re Hewitt's Will 91
N. Y. 261 (1883); In 7e O'Neil's Will, 91 N. Y. 516 (1883); Tonnele v.
Hall, 4 N. Y. 140 (1850) ; In re Blair's Will, 152 N. Y. 645, 46 N. E. 1145
(1897); In re Diehl's Will, 112 N. Y. S. 717 (Sur. 1908); In re Talbot's
Will, 154 N. Y. S. 1083 (Sur. 1915); Baker v. Baker, 51 Oh. St. 217, 37
N. B. 125 (1894); Glancy v. Glancy, 17 Oh. St. 135 (1866); Wineland's
Appeal, 118 Pa. St. 37; 12 Atl. 301 (1888); Goods of Milward, 1 Curt
912 (Ece. 1838); Baker's Appeal, 107 Pa. St. 381 (1884); Heise v. Heise,
31 Pa. St. 246 (1858); Hays v. Harden, 6 Barr 409 (Pa. 1847); In re
Young's Will, 153 Wis. 337; 141 N. W. 226 (1913).
(c) The signature in the margin:-Goods of Coombs, L. R. 1 P.
& D. 302 (1866); Graham v. Edwards, 162 Ky. 771 (1915); Collins'
Goods, Ir. L. 3 Eq. 241 (1849); Murguiondo v. Nowlan, 115 Va. 160, 78
S. E. 600 (1913); Thomson v. Carruth, 218 Mass. 524, 106 N. B. 159
(1914).
(d) Writing in the margin:-In re Gibson's Will, 128 App. Div.
769, 113 N. Y. S. 266 (1908) ; Irwin v. Jacques, 71 Ohio 395, 73 N. E. 683
(1905); in re Swires Estate, 225 Pa. 188, 73 Atl. 1110 (1909).
(e) Insertions and incorporations:-Goods of Birt, L. R. 2 P.
D. 214 (1871); In re Conway, 124 N. Y. 455, 26 N. E. 1028 (1891); In re
Whitney, 153 N. Y. 259, 47 N. E. 272 (1897); In re Schlegel's Will,
62 Misc. Rep. 439, 116 N. Y. S. 1038 (Sur. 1909); In re Field's Will, 204
N. Y. 448, 97 N. E.. 881 (1912) ; Baker's Appeal, 107 Pa. St. 381 (1884);
In re Maginnis' Estate, 278 Pa. 89, 122 Atl. 264 (1923).
(f) Inverted pagination:-Goods of Wathen, L. R. 3 P. & D. 159
(1874); In re Andrew's Will, 162 N. Y. 1, 56 N. E. 529 (1900); In re
Peiser's Will, 140 N. Y. S. 844 (Sur. 1913); Baker's Appeal, supra e.
note 14; In re Maginnis' Estate, 278 Pa. 89, 122 Atl. 264 (1923).
(g) Horizontal space between the body of the will and signature:-mee v. Bryer, 1 Rob. Eec. 616 (1849); Ayres v. Ayres, 1 Rob.
(These
Bce. 466 (1847); Goods of Shadwell, 2 Rob. Ecc. 140 (1849).
English cases are governed by the original Wills Act -f 1837.) Barne-
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the early English cases, when written by the testator's own
hand 5 . Most American jurisdictions have followed this view
where the statute did not require the name to appear elsewhere18 . They however usually require the will to have been
holographic and will not give effect to such writing of the name
a, a signature if another was draftsman of the will including
testator's name. But some jurisdictions hold the will is valid
when so signed, though it is not holographic, if the testator has
acknowledged the instrument as his will1". This seems an exceedingly questionable position to take when the statute requires a will to be signed by the testator or by another at his
direction. That is, a distinction is universally made between
the dispositive parts of the will and the so-called execution part
and a general direction to draft a will is not specifically a direction to sign the testator's name. So in .Virginiawhere the statute
requires that the signature by the testator be made so as to make
it manifest that the name was intended as a signature, it has always been held that the name appearing in the exordium was
insufficient as a signature whether written by the testator or by
another' s .
Even though the name appear in the exordium if it be
clear that the testator intended to sign on the completion of the
will, the first appearance of his name will not be regarded as a
signature because it was not so intended. So when he began the
wall v. Murrell, 108 Ala. 366, 18 So. 831 (1895); Owens v. Douglas, 121
Ark. 448, 181 S. W. 896 (1915); In re Seaman's Estate, 146 Cal. 455,
80 Pac. 700 (1905); Estate of Blake, 136 Cal. 306, 68 Pac. 827 (1902);
Lucas v. Brown, 187 Ky. 502, (1920); Thomson v. Carruth, 218 Mass.
524, 106 N. B. 159 (1914); Younger v. Duffie, 94 N. Y. 535 (1884); In
re Kunkler's Will, 147 N. Y. S. 1094 (.Sur. 1914); In re Busch's Will,
150 N. Y. S. 419 (Sur. 1914); Mader v. Apple, 80 Oh. St. 691, 89 N. E.
37 (1902); In re Morrow's Estate, 204 Pa. 479, 54 AtI. 313 (1903); In
re Young's Will, 153 Wis. 337, 141 N. W. 226 (1913).
(h)
Signature spatially after the subscriptions:-Roberts v. Phillips, 4 El. & Bl. 450 (Q. B. 1855) (Wills Act applicable); Goods of Casmore, L. R. 1 P. & D. 653 (1869).
11Lemayne v. Stanley, supra note 14 (a).
"Meads v. Earle, 205 Mass. 553, 91 N. E. 916 (1910); Adams v.
Field, 21 Vt. 256 (1849); contra In re Phelan'sBstate, 82 N. J. Eq. 316,
647, 87 Atl. 625, D1 Atl. 1070 (1913).
, Armstrong v. Armstrong, 29 Ala. 538 (1857); Miles' Will; Armstrong v. Walton, supra (a) note 14.
Walter v. Waller; Ramsey v. Ramsey's Exr.; Ray v. Bay, supra;
Savage v. Bowen, supra (a) note 14.
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writing of his name at the end and from weakness was unable
to complete it, there is no signature1 .
The view taken by the Virginia courts under their statute
might very well have been taken without such a statute. It is
highly questionable whether a testator beginning his will with
his own name thinks he is authenticating the instrument as his
act. It is more likely that he means merely to identify the
writer. The Virginia court believes that the position of the
signature, whether at the end or not, should indicate finality of
the whole act, 20 and that the name appearing in the exordium is
at most equivocal.
The earlier English cases were liberal in their construction
of the phrase "at the end thereof" in the Wills Act, and allowed a considerable space between the end of the disposing
part of the will and the signature21 . It was early held, however, 2 2 that if he signed the will spacially too soon it failed
though the later words, as for example, the date were unnecessary and unimportant. In Sweetland v. Sweetland22 * it was
held that a will must be signed at the end and not sooner. Here
the instrument consisted of five pages of dispositive matter. The
writing on the ftfth sheet ended in the middle of a sentence and
in the sixth sheet provision was made for the remuneration of
trustees, a revocatory clause, and an attestation clause. The signature was at the bottom of the fifth sheet and the will failed.
But in a later case23 where testator made his mark in the
middle of a card the will was sustained though the whole card
was occupied with the will, the subscriptions of the attesters
being on the reverse side. In another case where the testator
wrote his name in a slanting direction beginning at a word in
the third line from the end of the writing and terminating his
signature in the last line of the writing, the will was held valid
and the clause over which the name extended was also probated2 4. In Goods of Malen25 the draftsman copied the pro1EBverhart v. Everhart, supra (a) note 14; Plate's Estate, 148 Pa.
St. 55, 23 A. 1038 (1892).
Ramsey v. Ramsey's Exr., supra (a) note 14.
Cf. In re SeamaW's Estate, 146 Cal. 455, 80 Pac. 100 (1905).
Goods of Milwar, 1 Curt. 912 (Ece. 1838).
"* 4 Sw. & Tr. 6 (Ecc. 1865).
"Margary v. Robinson, L. R. 12 P. D. 8 (1886); Cf. Goods of Ains.
(The statute had been amended in
worth, L. R. 2 P. & D. 151 (1870)
1852).
21Goods of Wooetley, 3 Sw. & Tr. 429 (Ec. 1864).
54 L. J. Prob. 91 (1885).
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visions of the will upon a printed form and was unable to get
all in above the testimonium clause. The unfinished sentence
was continued on the next page. The signature preceded the
unfinished non-dispositive sentence and the attester's subscriptions followed it. Probate without the last sentence wai
granted.
This case then, raises the question what shall be done when
the signature comes too soon. There are four alternatives; (a)
let the entire will fail; (b) let the portion of the will written
above the signature stand; (c) let the part above the signature
stand if no essential or dispositive part follows the signature or
(d) as in England under the Lord St. Leonard's Act, let both
parts stand if the signature is so placed at or after or under or
following or beside or opposite to the end of the will that it
should be apparent that the testator intended to give effect to
the writing as his will.
A number of courts have adopted the first alternative 2 6.
This result however, does not seem to be required under the
statute and in many cases an otherwise perfectly valid will will
fail when it ought to be sustained. Other courts take the
second alternative 27 . But the will ought not to stand if the
result from such partial failure would cause an inequality in
the testator's bounty such that he would not wish this part of
the will to stand alone. The only safe rule would be to hold
that if substantial dispositions appear after the signature, the
will must fail.
The third alternative seems sound in all cases where the
statute requires a will to be signed at the end thereof. The
Kentucky court has stated the rule thus: "If the part following
the signature is dispositive which adds to or revokes previous
bequests, the whole instrument is invalid; but if the clause
added does not affect the disposition of the estate, it does not
invalidate the instrument."
It was therefore held that the
naming of executors written under the place of the signature
did not invalidate the will 28 . In order to reach a result substan20 Gooas of Milwara, supra (b) note 14; In re Hewitt's Wil, 91 N.
Y. 261 (1883); In re o'Neips Wiul, supra (b) note 14; In re Blair's
Will, supra (b) note 14; In re Diehl's Wi7, 112 N. Y. S. 717 (Sur. 1908);
Hays v. Harden, 6 Barr 409 (Pa. 1847).
"Heise v. Heise, supra (b) note 14; Wikoff's Apeal, 15 Pa. St.
281 (1850); In re Taylor's Estate, 230 Pa. 346, 79 At. 632 (1911).
21Ward v. Putnam, 119 Ky. 889 (1905). See also Dallow's Case, L.
R. 1 P. & D. 189 (1866); Winelanfs Appeal, 118 Pa. St. 37, 12 AtI. 301
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tially like that reached by the English Courts under Lord St.
Leonard's Act, it has been held that if the testator writes "see
next page," near the place where he later signs his name, what
follows is incorporated by reference. Such writing can scarcely
be technically incorporated by reference. If incorporated at
all it is by attachment similar to an insertion. In one case a map
attached below the signature was likewise said to have been incorporated 29 . In in re Jacoby's Estate"o the testator wrote on
a paper which he signed and left lying on his strong box, "In
ease of death I want this box to go to my attorney." The box
contained stocks, mortgages and numerous papers evidencing
property interests. If we assume that the paper was testamentary then it seems that our further problem is not one of
incorporating the box and its contents by reference as the court
assumed, nor again should the question be raised whether the
will is signed at the end, but rather the questions are is the box
identified, and how far will the gift of the container carry with it
all manner of contents 31 .
If a will is to be signed at the end precisely what is meant
by "the end thereof"? The physical will consists of the substratum or paper together with ink or other substance so distributed and in such form over the surface of the substratum
that ideas are thereby conveyed. It is not proper therefore to
say either that the substratum is the will or the ink so. distributed is the will, but that the whole taken together constitutes
the instrument. How are we to determine just what is meant
by "the end thereof"? Did the legislature intend the physical
end of the paper to be the place for the signature or a place next
to that portion of the will last written; or a place near that part
of the will which from its position was intended to terminate
the provisions of the will?
(1888); Glancy v. Glancy, supra (b) note 14; Everhart v. Everhart,
supra (a) note 14; Beaumont's Estate, 216 Pa. 350, 65 A. 799 (1907);
Teed's Estate, 225 Pa. 633, 74 At. G46 (1909). The Kentucky Statute

re.quires a testator to subscribe his will but does not say "at the end

thereof." The court finds that he can subscribe only at "the end
thereof." Soward v. Soward, 62 Ky. 126 (1863). See on this matter
a good note by George Ragland, Jr., in 16 Ky. Law Journal 159, 161
(1928).
29 Tonnele v. HaZl, supra (b) note 14;
3190 Pa. St. 382, 42 Atl. 1026 (1899).
ISee 25 Col. L. Rev. 897, note 81 (1925).
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Probably the first alternative was not exclusively intended,
for if it were then a signature placed either on the margin or
after the last numbered paragraph on the margin would not be
sufficient 82. The second seems excluded because an interlineation written just before the testator signs would be last written
and would require the signature to be made in the midst of the
wil 33 . The last again seems not exclusively intended, for if it
were, then if marginal continuations were not allowed by the
writing of the signature nearby but the instrument were signed
at the physical end of the substratum, the will would faiL
Again, it is metaphysically impossible to sign so close to "the
end thereof" but that some space will intervene between the
end and the signature. A practical, pragmatic interpretation
of the requirement is almost necessary. If taking the instrument as a whole into consideration, giving due weight to both
the substratum and the surface material, it is possible to say
that the will is signed at the end, then the court should reach
that conclusion.
The problem does not greatly differ whether the signature
appears in the margin, or some of the testamentary provisions
are in the margin. In Irwin v Jacques34 it was held, that "the
end thereof" was a matter of law and not of fact. Here on the
margin of the last page beginning at the bottom of the page and
slightly below the signature on the opposite side of the page
were three vertical lines containing dispository matter and also
a provision against contest. Oial evidence established that
these lines were written before the testator signed. The will
was held invalidly signed principally because there was no continuity in thought between the marginal lines and the body of the
instrument. "There should be some word or character used as a
reference tb the place it should occupy in relation to the other
provisions so that the end may be ascertained." The court also
thought that if the marginal matter was the end of the will, the
instrulnent was not signed at the end. The court forgets that the
instrument might well be regarded as signed at the end if due
,2 Graham v. Edwards, 162 Ky. 771 (1915); Collins' Goods, Ir. L. RL
3 Eq. 241 (1849). In Virginia under the statute a marginal signature
may be good; Murguiondo v. Nowzan, 115 Va. 160, 78 S. E. 600 (1913).
' Goods of Coombs, L. R. I P & D 302 (1866)
under Lord St. Leonard's Act.
371 Ohio 395, 73 N. E. 683 (1905).
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consideration is given to the physical elements of the will. The
opposite result was reached in Swire's Estate35 . There, however, the marginal provisions were numbered and thus were
shown clearly to be later than those written transversely, the signature being at the physical end of the paper. In another case
the will was sustained though the marginal matter was rejected.
Such matter extended from slightly above the signature on the
left margin to slightly below the place where the attesters
subscribed 36.
In England an incorporation by attaching the 'vriting proposed to be incorporated and showing its relative position in
the instrument, does not affect the legality of the position of the
signature 37 . But the contrary has been held in New York. In
in re Conway38 the words "carried to the back of the will" appeared just after the dispository part and before the signature.
On the back of the will appeared "continued" followed by
matter intended for incorporation. This was held invalid. In
another case the words "see annexed sheet" were added similarly at the close of the second paragraph and a sheet was attachea at that place to the first page of the instrument with
metal staples and this sheet had to be turned back in order for
one to read the first page. Here again the will was held not
signed at the end 39. But later the New York court changed its
mind and held a similar incorporation did not affect the validity
of the signature4". Parol evidence is admissible to show whether
or not the insertion was made prior to the signing 41 . There can
be no reasonable doubt but that the latter view was the sound.
one. The legislaturd was not concerned with the style of the
draftsmanship of the will, nor with the question how forgotten
matter might be cared for, but only with the completed result.
The signature was at the end of the will if the will should, be
read in its natural and consecutive order.
Suppose the testator, as letter writers sometimes do, should
begin on page one, then pass to page three of the paper and com"225 Pa. 188, 73 At. 1110 (1909).
" In re Gibson's Will, 113 N. Y. S. 266 (Sup. Ct App. Div. 1908).
"Goods of Birt, L. R. 2 P & D 214 (1871).
"124 N. Y. 455, 26 N. E. 1028 (1891).

1 In re Whitney, supra note 14 (e). Cf. In re Schlegel's Will, supra
-note (14(e) (Sur. 1909).
,0In re Field's Will, supra (e) note 14.
4In
re Swire's Estate, supra (d) note 14.
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plete his writing and sign it on page two; has he signed at the
end? In Goods of Whalen 4 2 the testatrix began on page two,
continued on page three and completed the instrument on page
one where she signed her name. The court treated page one as
page three and the will was properly signed. But New York
has held the other way 43 and only recently has it come to the
view of the English courts 44 . So it has been held in Pennsylvania that the testator may not conform to the order of consecutive pages when writing on foolscap; he may begin on the
fourth page and go backwards, or go from the first to the third
page and then to the second. But the order of connection
should appear on the face of the will 45. In In re Stinson's
Estate46 there was a similar passing from first to third page
and from there to the second. The only means of determining
the order was by the way the pages were numbered.
In the earlier cases the English courts paid more regard to
the question whether a will was signed spacially too soon rather
than too late. It was thought that the Act of 1837 was intended
to overrule the position taken in Lemayne v. Stanley, that the
writing of the testator's name by his own hand in the exordium
But additions, difficult to trace and easily
was sufficient.
entered by fraud and forgery would be more easily prevented if the other feature were considered, viz.: that a signature
should not be made too far- away from the conclusion of the
provisions of the will. It was as easy to fill in blank spaces
"7
above the signature as below it. Finally in Smee v. BryCr.
where the signature was entered about one-half way down on
the fourth page of a folded paper but the dispositions closed
nearly one inch from the conclusion of the third page, the will
was held to be invalid.
In this connection it should be recalled that a testator may
write within his will anything he desires, a poem, the Lord's
Prayer, or what not 4s. This is not to be treated as blank space
and a signature written thereafter is valid. So a long and fulsome testimonium clause immediately prior to the signature
Supra (f) note 14.
re Andrew's 'Will, supra (f) note 14.
In re Peiser's Will, supra (f) note 14.
45Bakcr's Appcal, 107 Pa. St. 381 (1884).
4228 Pa. 475, 77 A. 807 (1910).
41 Supra (g) note 14.
4
"Barnewall v. Murrell, 108 Ala. 366, 18 So. 831 (1895).
42

4'In
41
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does not prevent the will from being duly signed 49. Likewise
the signature placed after rather than before the attestation
clause is valid since it is entirely possible to regard that clause
as a part of the will50 . So where testator signs at the close of
the dispository part and again at the close of the attestation
clause but later erases the first signature, the will is still well
executed 51 . It is generally held that if the signature comes
somewhere within the attestation clause there is the same
result 2. Again though space is left between the testimonium
clause and the dispository provisions, the will is valid since that
clause is clearly a part of the will, though not an essential
part5 3 , and naturally precedes the signature. For an extreme
case see Mader v. Apple54 where a blank space of about twentyfour inches occurred between the provisions of the will and the
testimonium clause 55. It also appears that although blank
spaces between paragraphs afford opportunities for later additions, difficult to detect, yet the requirement that the signature
be at "the end thereof" can not control that matter 5 . It would
be exceedingly embarrassing to frame an effective and equitable
statute that would prevent such a possibility.
Again, the will should not be invalid just because the signature of the testator follows the subscriptions of the attesters. The chief difficulty here is likely to be that prima facie
it would be assumed that appearing later, the signature was
written later in time. If evidence is forthcomnig to show that
the proper order in time was observed, then the spacial order
should not defeat the will. It is still possible to say that it is
signed at "the end thereof'' 57. It is sometimes urged that signing at "the end thereof" refers to time as well as to space5 s and
for that reason again the time order between signing by the testator and subscribing by the attesters should be observed. It
49Younger

v. Duffie, 94 N. Y. 535 (1884).

In re Kunkler's Will; In re Busch s Will, supra (g) note 14.
"In re Young's Will, supra (b) note 14.
"In re Dellart's Will, 122 N. Y. S. (Sup. Ct.) 220 (1910); In re
Kunkler's Will, supra (g) note 14. Sears v. Sears, 77 Oh. St. 104, 82 N.
E. 1067 (1907) contra.
"Estate of Blake, 136 Cal. 306, 68 Pac. 827 (1902).
"Supra note 14 (b).
Cf. In re Morrow's Estate, supra 14 (g).
"BarnewaZl v.Murrell, 108 Ala. 366, 18 So. 831 (1895); In re Field's
Will, 204 N. Y. 448, 97 N. E. 881 (1912).
"Roberts v. Phillips,4 El. & Bl. 450 (Q. B. 1855).
In re Foley's Will, 136 N. Y. S. 933 (Sur. 1912).
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seems doubtful, however, whether the' legislature meant anything
further than the spacial end. Thomson v Carrut 5 9 reaches a
curious result. The testator signed his will in the margin and
then it was subscribed. Later the suggestion was made that the
appearance was "sloppy" and the testator again signed the will
between the testimonium and the attestation clauses. The latter
signature was invalid because of the temporal order. The court
held that testator could not sign a will twice and it is a question
of fact whether he intended the first to be his signature. Would
a jury be warranted in finding that the latter was intended as
his signature and that therefore the first one was not? We apprehend not' 0.
THE FORm OP THE SIGNATURE OR SUBSCRIPTION.
Difficulty is occasionally experienced with respect to the
form of the signing, either by the testator or by the attesters.
The difficulties may be described as follows: the signature is by
mark and occasionally someone present adds to it an erroneous
-name; the signature is illegible; the signature is made in some
other way than by writing, as for example by seal; a fictitious
,name is assumed; the signature is incomplete; the wrong name
is inadvertently signed; the testator or attester intentionally assumes a fictitious name.
When the signature is by mark s ' and the mark is identified
by another person who purports to indicate the maker by writing his name near to it, it is the mark, not the identification,
that is effective to make valid the will; hence an erroneous identification should not cause the will to fail6 2 ; if the signature is
illegible as a signature, it should still be good as a mark 3 . The
statute requires a will to be signed but does not declare the
method, hence a seal should be sufficient 64.
A description of the signer should be as good as his name"Your miserable father" 0 5 identifies the person; signing also

4.

"9218 Mass. 524, 106 N. E. 159 (1:914).
,Cf. In re Young's 'will, supra note 14 (b).
"Re Bryce, 2 Curt. Eccl. 325 (1839) ; ,Shanks v. Christopher,3 A. K.
Marsh 144, 10 (Ky.) (1820); Garnett v. Foston, 122 Ky. 195, 91 S. W.
668 (1906).
"Re Ashmore, 3 Curt. Ecc. 756 (1843); Re Clark, 1 Sw. & Tr. 22
(Ecc. 1858); Goods of Douce, 2 Sw. & Tr. 593 (Ecc. 1862).
"Sheehan v. Kearney, 82 Miss. 688, 21 So. 41 (1896).
Goods of Emerson, Ir. L. R. 9 Eq. 443 (1883).
"In re Brennan's Estate, 244 Pa. 574, 91 A. 220 (1914) (but this
case holds contra).
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"Servant to Mr. Spurling' is sufficient 6 . A limitation attached
to the name of the attester, as for example "written by A'7'
will not prevent his subscription from being valid as an attester
unless it is clearly shown that he did not intend to subscribe
as such, since there was no occasion for him to subscribe as
draftsman. But the signature or mark must identify the signer
and writing the name of the town from which he comes will not
have that effect 68 . A mark or even the given name made in the
attempt to sign one's name is not sufficient when not intended
as a completed act 69 . But if the signing was a completed act
it is sufficient though the given name only is written70 or even
the initials only 71 .
The statutes require a will to be signed by the testator and
attested and subscribed by the attesters. If they or any of them
write a fictitious name have they complied with the statutory requirement? It is to be observed that the statute does not say
that they are to use their own or their true name. It is also
true that a man may identify himself and bind himself in other
transactions by signing some other than his baptismal name.
There is no sufficient reason why this practice if followed with
respect to wills, should invalidate them, and it was so held in
Kentucky 72.
Should it make a difference if, instead of an intentional assumption of a false name the signer should inadvertently do so ?
California has held7" that the statute requiring a witness to sign
his name is not complied with if he does not sign his true name.
On the other hand, in the case of In re Jacob's W1174 the New
York Supreme Court held that when an attester inadvertently
signed the name of the testator instead of his own name the will
was validly subscribed. It is believed that the New York view
complies with the requirements of the statute and also is more
in accord with the spirit of it. The testator has done all we
Goods of Spurting, 3 Sw. & Tr. 272 (Ecc. 1863).
'WeZZs v. Lewis, 190 Ky. 626 (1921).
Goods of Trevanion, 2 Rob. Eccl. 311 (1850).
Goods of Maddock, L. R. 169, 3 P. & D. (1874); Everhart v. Everhart,supra note 14 (a); Plate'sEstate, 148 Pa. St. 55, 23 A. 1083 (1892).
"Knox's Appeal, 131 Pa. 220, 17 A. S. R. 798 (1890).
"Pilcher v. Pilcher,117 Va. 356, 84 S. E. 667 (1915).
"Reed v. Hendrix, 180 Ky. 57 (1918). Cf. Goods of Redding, 2
Rob. Eccl. 339 (1850).
"In re Walker's Estate, 110 Cal. 387, 42 P. 815 (1895).
11132 N. Y. Sup. 481 (1911).
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can expect of him in procuring attesters and it is an illiberal
constructon which makes such a will fail. If an intentional assumption of such name were established it seems clear enough
that the will would stand.
5.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT AND ADOPTION

o1

NAME WRITTEN AT AN

EARLIER TIME.

Suppose an attester subscribes before the testator signs the
will; or -an attester subscribes out of the presence of the testator; or the testator signs and makes a later addition and the attesters then subscribe, is it possible that in any or all of these
cases a later acknowledgment and adoption of the signature or
subscription so made may cure the defect?
New York75 and Indiana70 have held that such may be
the result. In Massachusetts 77 when the testator had written
his name in the exordium probably not intending it at the
moment it was penned, as a signature, it was held that after
the entire will was drafted he could adopt the whole as his act
and thus make his name, so placed, a signature. But how much
is due to this reasoning and how much is due to Lemayne v.
,Stanlcy as a precedent, it is difficult to say.
It has been well said that the purpose of requiring the attester to subscribe is not to detect insanity and prevent fraud,
though these are incidental benefits, but to identify the instrument.78 . There is, -however, another very important purpose,
and that is that there may be evidence by the subscription that
the subscriber attested7 9 . It is believed that the attesting and
the subscribing must be by the same persons; that a will would
be invalid if attested only by A, B, and C and subscribed only
by D, E, and F s 0. Hence the act of subscribing is the only admissible evidence that the instrument was attested by anyone if
we assume a statute that requires both attesting and subscribing. In Pennsylvania, a will in the past, need not have been
subscribed by the attesters81 .
5In re Karrer's Will, supra note 12.
71
1 Wright v. Wright, 5 Ind. 389 (1854).
Meads v. Earle, supra note 14 (a).
"Swift v. WiTey, 1 B. Monroe (Ky.) 114 (1840); Canada's Appeal,
47 Conn. 450 (1880); Nutnm v. Ehlcrt, 218 Mass. 471 (1914); 106 N. E.
163.
"' Duffit v. Corridon, supra, note 12.
'10n re Sloan's Estate, 184 I1. 579, 56 N. E. 952 (1900).
' Hight v. Wilson, 1 Dallas 94 (Pa. 1784).
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If this be true, then certainly there can be no adoption of
a former subscription made prior to the signature of the testator because the subscription was made before the act attested
was performed, and the evidence of the attestation consists now
of oral words8 2. If the subscription which is adopted was
written beyond the presence of the testator this constitutes another reason why the will must fail8 3. If the testator signs and
later makes an addition to his will, this addition remains unsigned and an oral adoption of the signature still leaves it an
unsigned addition 84 . To retrace the name with a dry pen has
no greater efficacy 8 5 . But as already shown, the fact that the
witnesses acknowledge their subscription at the instant they
are made is a circumstance bearing upon the question whether
or not the subscribing was in the presence of the testator.
OTHER PROBLEMS OF EXECUTION.

(a) (What is Attested?) Many other incidental questions
arise, as for example, what is the difference between attestation
and subscription, and what do the subscribers attest? Assuming that attestation is a mental act, the evidence of the performance of which consists of the subscribing, the question
arises, toward what is this mental act directed? The Statute
of Frauds required: "Devises shall be . . . signed, . . . attested and subscribed." The Wills Act provided "No will shall
be valid unless . . . it shall be signed . . . and such signature
shall be made or acknowledged . . . in the presence of two or
- and such witness shall attest and shall
more witnesses
subscribe the will." What is meant by attesting a devise or a
will? This is a curiously difficult question to answer and has
led some courts to assert that it does not differ from subscription and that the two terms are used together for the sake of
fullness of expression 6 . Kentucky was one of the first jurisdictions to make the distinction clear 8 7.
82

Marshall v. Mason, 176 Mass. 216, 57 N. E. 340 (1900).
3Lamb v. Girtman, 33 Ga. 289 (1862); Duffit v. Corridon, supra, n.
12; Ragland v. Huntington, 23 N. C. (10 Ired L.) 561 (1841); Go's Will,
supra, n. 12; In re Downie's Will, supra, n. 2; Mendell v. Dunbar, 169
Mass. 74, 47 N. E. 402 (1897).
"Charles et at. v. Huber et al., 78 Pa. St. 448 (1875).
' Playne v. Scriven, 1 Rob. Ecc. 772 (1849); In re Foley's Will,
supra, n. 58.
=Lane v. Lane, supra, n. 12; Drury v. Connell, supra, n. 2; Skinner
v.Anerican Bible Soc., 92 Wis. 209, 65 N. W. 1037 (1896).
"Swift V. Wiley, supra, n. 12.
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It has been said that to attest means to bear witness to
those facts with respect to which he must testify at the time of
probate8s . What are those facts? It is sufficient in jurisdictions which do not require a publication of the will, for the attester to see the testator sign or hear him acknowledge his signature already made89 , whether the Statute follows the Wills
Act or the Statute of Frauds. It seems rather clear, however,
under the Wills Act, that the attester must see the signing or
liear the acknowledgment"0 . It is also held that under the Wills
Act if the signature is acknowledged only, it must at the time be
visible whether the attester actually sees it or not; that a publication of the will to the attesters if they do not see the signing
or cannot see the signature is insufficient even though the signature is in fact already made91 . The attestation has principal
reference to the signature even though the Statute merely requires the will to be attested92 .
It is clear that under the Statute of Frauds it was not necessary to be able to see the signature if there was a publication
of the will to the attesters93 . It is believed therefore, that under
those statutes which resemble the Statute of Frauds a will should
be held valid even though the testator did not sign nor acknowledge the signature to the attesters specifically, if in fact the
signature was there and he published the will to them as his
"Nunn v. Bhlert, supra, n. 78.
Wright v. Wright, 7 Bing. 458 (C. P. 1831); Griffith v. Griffith, 44
.Ky. 511 (1845) ; In re Ludwig's W1l, 79 Minn. 101, 81 N. W. 758 (1900) ;
Ellis v. Smith, 1 Ves. Jr. 11 (Ch. 1754) seems to have been the first case
which held that, the attestation of the testator's acknowledgment of his
signature fulfilled the statutory requirements.
",Ludwig's Will, supra, n. 89; Haynes v. Haynes, 33 Ohio St. 598,
31 A, R. 579 (1878); Simmons v. Leonard, 91 Tenn. 183, 18 S. W. 280
(1892).
"9Goods of Gunstan,7 P. D. 102 (1882); Daintree v. Fasulo, 13 P. D.
67 (1888); Hudson v. Parker, 1 Rob. Ece. 14 (1844); Blake v. Blake, 7
P. A. 102 (1882); Goods of Thompson, 4 N. of C. 643 (1846); In re
Mackay's Will, 110 N. Y. 611, 18 N. E. 433 (1888); Lewis v. Lewis, 11
N. Y. 221 (1854); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 16 .Hun. 97; affirmed 77 N. Y.
596 (1879); Richard v. Orth, 40 Oreg. 571, 66 Pac. 925 (1901). Beckett
v. Howe, 2 P. & D. 1 (1869) contra.
"9Brooksv. Woodson, 87 Ga. 379, 13 S. E. 712 (1891); gimmons
v. Leonard, supra n. 90.
3 Lacey v. Dobbs, 63 N. J. Eq. 325 (1901); White v. Trustees British
Museum, 6 Bing. 310 (C. P. 1829); Gould v. Chicago Theological Seminary, 189 I1. 282, 59 N. E. 536 (1901); Daugherty's Estate, 168 Mich.
281, 134 N. W. 24 (1912).
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act 94. It is possible therefore, under the earlier statute to
attest the signing, the acknowledgment or the publication and
the attestation of any one of them is sufficient. It was held in
95
Inglesant v. Inglesant"
that if the testator could hear a third
person make the request and did nothing, this was sufficient acknowledgment of his signature".
(b) (Third Person Requests Attesters to Subscribe.) A
request by the testator to the attesters to sign is commonly held
a sufficient acknowledgment 7 . Kentucky holds that such request by a third person without more in which the testator does
not join is ineffective as an acknowledgment 9". There must be
some sort of act for which the testator is responsible which
shows he means the attesters to understand that the instrument
is his acknowledgment of the signature.
(e)
(Another Writes the Name of an Attester.) It i5
well established that another may sign the testator's name to
his will and the Wills Act makes specific provision therefor.
May another person, whether he be an attester or not, sign the
name of an attester? There is no specific provision with reference thereto in the Statute, and for that reason it is sometimes
held that this possibility is excluded since that provision is expressly made with respect to the testator 9 9. Eapressio unius
exclusio alterius est. But this is a non-sequitur. There is no
sufficient reason why the subscribing of a will sliould differ
from the signing of other instruments. Qui facit per alium facit
"Goods of Gunstdn, supra, n. 91; In re Ludwig's Will, supra, n. 89;
Tobin v. Haack, 79 Minn. 101, 87 N. W. 758 (1900); Nunn v. Ehlert,
supra, n. 88 contra.
"L. R. 3 P. & D. (1872-75). Cf. Daintree v. Fasulo, supra, n. 91;
Haynes v. Haynes, supra, n. 90.
"Manners v. Manners, 72 N. J. Eq. 854; 66 Atl. 583 (1907) contra.
"White v. Trustees British Museum, supra, n. 93; Daintree v.
Fasulo, supra, n. 91; Rla v. Edwards, 16 Gray 91 (Mass. 1860); Tilden
v. Tilden, 13 Gray 110 (Mass. 1859); Hogan v. Grosvenor, 10 Met. 54
(Mass. 1845); Hall v. Hall, 17 Pick. 373 (Mass. 1835); In re Landy's
Will, 161 N. Y. 429, 55 N. E. 914 (1900) (a question for, the jury).
Roberts v. Welch, 46 Vt. 164 (1873) contra.
"Griffith v. Griffith, supra, n. 89; Moore v. Sanders, 202 Ky. 28G
(1924).
"Simmons v. Leonard, supra, n. 90; Bush v. McFarland, 94 Tenn,
538, 29 S. W. 899 (1895); Riley v. Riley, 36 Ala. 496 (1860); (at least if
the attester is able to sign his own name; Horton v. Johnson, 18 Ga.
396 (1855); Bush v. McFarland, 94 Tenn. 538, 29 S. W. 899 (1895).

KENTUCKY LAW JounNAL

per se. 100 It may well be, however, that an attester cannot, as
the testator may, substitute an acknowledgement of his signature
for a subscribing in the presence of his co-attesters. 10 1
We conclude that to make "within his sight" the sole test
of "in the presence of the testator" is to make an addition to
the statute which is unnecessary and undesirable; first, because
it either excludes blind persons from making wills or makes a
special class of them; second, because it is entirely possible to
be within sight but so far away that in no reasonable sense can
the test be applied; third, because there are other senses than
the sense of sight, and the use of those other senses when there
is a reasonable contiguity, may well give rise to a situation
where the attesters are in the presence of-the testator though he
cannot see them.
The testator should always sign before the witnesses subscribe. If the order is the reverse, a situation arises similar
to that where an interlineation is made after the complete execution of the rest of the will. Such interlineation made later is
never sustained because it was not signed and subscribed. One
purpose of subscription is to identify the witnesses as attesters
and if they attest after they subscribe, the will is no better than
if one set of persons attested and an entirely different set subscribed.
There is no sufficient reason for putting a narrow construction upon the requirement that a will must be signed "at the end
thereof." The will is not paper only, nor ink only distributed
over the surface of the paper in a given way. If-the will is
signed where the last writing closes (not an interlineation) it
should be good. If it is signed at the bottom of the page and
the writing is above it again the will should be good when either
internal or parol evidence shows that it was all written before
it was signed and subscribed. When there are incorporations
to be made and by the natural order of perusal one would read
them at the place where it is indicated they belong, the will
1 Turner v. Cook, 36 Ind. 129, 136 (1871); Schnee v. Schnee, 61
Kan. 643, 60 P. 738 (1900); Upchurch v. Upchurch, 16 B. Monroe, 102

(Ky. 1855); Lora v. Lord, 58 N. H. 7, 42 A. R. 565 (1876); 14 re Strong's
Will, 16 N. Y. Sup. 104 (1891); Mock v. Kaufman, 82 N. Y. Sup. 310
(1903); Riley v. Riley, 36 Ala. 496 (1860); Jesse v. Parker, 6 Gratt. 57
(Va. 1849).
""Den v. Mitton, 7 HoIst. 70 (N. J. L. 1830).
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should be regarded as signed at the end if they are not later additions.
It also seems that any name or mark used by an attester
should be sufficient to comply with the statutory requirement
-when a fictitious name is voluntarily assumed or another name
than his own is inadvertently written. A descriptive term should
suffice, as also the use of a nickname or initials, if he intends to
so identify himself. "Your miserable father" seems entirely
adequate inasmuch as the description leaves no doubt as to who
so identified himself. There is no provision for the adoption of
one's name formerly written, either by the testator or the attesters. Such a practice complies neither with the spirit nor the
letter of the statute.
Under statutes resembling the Wills Act it is clear that the
witness must attest either the signing or the acknowledgment
and if the latter, then the signature must be visible. That is,
a mere publication of the will is insufficient. There is no sufficient reason, however, why, under statutes following the Statute
of Frauds, one may not attest the signing, an acknowledgment
of the signature, or a publication of the will.
It should be entirely possible for another person to sign the
name for an attester at the latter's request. But if in no proper
sense the former is the agent of the latter in that regard and
the latter takes no part in the transaction, the will is not properly subscribed. While it would be undesirable practice for the
chief beneficiary under the will to subscribe for the attester,
yet that alone apart from fraud should not make invalid the
subscription.
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